Transvestite Law


Compiled by Romero Anton Montalban-Anderssen, Juris Doctor.

(I did not write these statutes...your elected officials did)
Federal Statutes


29 U.S.C.A. 706
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 29. LABOR
CHAPTER 16--VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND OTHER REHABILITATION SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS
Neither the term "individual with handicaps" nor the term "handicap" to apply to an individual for purposes of this chapter solely because that individual is a transvestite, see section 6(b)(3) of Pub.L. 100-430, set out as a note under section 3602 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For effective date on 180th day beginning after Sept. 13, 1988, see section 13(a) of Pub.L. 100-430, set out as a note under section 3601 of Title 42.

42 U.S.C.A. 3602
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 45--FAIR HOUSING
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERALLY
Transvestism
Section 6(b)(3) of Pub.L. 100-430 provided that: "For the purposes of this Act [see Short Title of 1988 Amendments note under section 3601 of this title] as well as chapter 16 of title 29 of the United States Code [ section 701 et seq. of Title 29, Labor], neither the term 'individual with handicaps' nor the term 'handicap' shall apply to an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite."


OASDI Regs, 20 CFR Pt. 404 foll. 404.1599, SUBPT. P, APP. 1, 42 U.S.C.A.App.
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
APPENDIX
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 20--EMPLOYEES' BENEFITS
PART 404--FEDERAL OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE (1950--) SUBPART P--DETERMINING DISABILITY AND BLINDNESS
APPENDIX 1 TO SUBPART P--LISTING OF IMPAIRMENTS
Disability claimant alleging alcoholism and seeking supplemental social security income benefits showed persistent pattern of several maladaptive behaviors enumerated in regulation defining personality disorders and listed results; claimant showed pathological suspiciousness or hostility evidenced by paranoia, was a closet transvestite, suffered from fetishism, experienced mood swings, and demonstrated impulsive behavior, his daily living activities were markedly restricted, he showed marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and he failed to persist or concentrate on anything, particularly with respect to his repeated rehabilitation efforts. Stokes v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, W.D.Pa.1990, 742 F.Supp. 270.

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 42. THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 126--EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES SUBCHAPTER IV--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
12208. Transvestites
For the purposes of this chapter, the term "disabled" or "disability" shall not apply to an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite.
A transsexual should be distinguished from homosexuals, who are sexually attracted to persons of the same sex, and from transvestites, who are most likely male heterosexuals who cross-dress for sexual arousal rather than comfort with gender identity. Both homosexuals and transvestites are "content with the sex into which they were born." Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n. 3 (7th Cir.1984); American Psychiatric Association, DSM-III-R 302.50, at 74 (1987); Wise & Meyer, Transvestism: Previous Findings and New Areas for Inquiry, 6 J. Sex & Marital Therapy 116-120 (1980). A transsexual is also to be distinguished from a hermaphrodite, where an individual has both genital and sexual characteristics of both sexes. Proof of Facts 3d: Tabor's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, at 758 (15th ed. 1988). In addition, the Court observes that: A transsexual believes that he is the victim of a biologic accident, cruelly imprisoned within a body incompatible with his real sexual identity. Most are men who consider themselves to have feminine gender identity and regard their genitalia and masculine features with repugnance. Their primary objective in seeking psychiatric help is not to obtain psychologic treatment but to secure surgery that will give them as close an approximation as possible to a female body. Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 1437 (14th ed. 1982). See generally Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 Conn.L.Rev. 288, 288 n. 1 (1975); Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 963, 963 n. 1 (1971).

State Statutes

CA GOVT 19572
TITLE 2. GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DIVISION 5. PERSONNEL
PART 2. STATE CIVIL SERVICE
CHAPTER 7. SEPARATIONS FROM SERVICE
ARTICLE 1. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
12. Dishonesty
Evidence supported finding that state highway patrolman gave false statements to superiors to conceal his conduct in connection with attendance at transvestite party, and such evidence supported finding of dishonesty justifying discipline. Warren v. State Personnel Bd. (App. 3 Dist. 1979) 156 Cal.Rptr. 351, 94 Cal.App.3d 95.

TITLE 2. GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DIVISION 5. PERSONNEL
PART 2. STATE CIVIL SERVICE
CHAPTER 7. SEPARATIONS FROM SERVICE
ARTICLE 1. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
1. Procedural safeguards, generally
Although state highway patrolman's conduct in connection with attendance at transvestite party indicated unfitness for employment and justified his dismissal, job-related extraordinary circumstances were not shown such as to justify immediate dismissal without prior procedural safeguards. Warren v. State Personnel Bd. (App. 3 Dist. 1979) 156 Cal.Rptr. 351, 94 Cal.App.3d 95.

CA PENAL 1093
PART 2. OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
TITLE 7. OF PROCEEDINGS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL AND BEFORE JUDGMENT
CHAPTER 2. THE TRIAL
Where prosecutor had agreed before trial on charges of kidnapping and sodomy that he would not introduce evidence of defendant's homosexual and transvestite tendencies, prosecutor should not have asked defendant on cross-examination if he felt any physical or sexual attraction toward male persons, but question was not prejudicial in view of victim's testimony as to explicit homosexual act and defendant's denial of sexual attraction to victim. People v. Brown (App. 4 Dist. 1970) 86 Cal.Rptr. 149, 6 Cal.App.3d 619.

IN ST 22-9.5-2-10
TITLE 22. LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
ARTICLE 9.5. INDIANA FAIR HOUSING
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS
22-9.5-2-10 "Disabled", scope of term
Sec. 10. (a) "Disabled" means, with respect to a person: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one (1) or more of the person's major life activities; (2) a record of having an impairment described in subdivision (1); or (3) being regarded as having an impairment described in subdivision (1). (b) The term does not include current illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act ( 21 U.S.C. 802)). (c) The term does not include an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite.

LA R.S. 14:10
LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES
TITLE 14. CRIMINAL LAW
CHAPTER 1. CRIMINAL CODE
PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
SUBPART B. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
Evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, despite his claim of intoxication; defendant's actions in repeatedly beating and then strangling transvestite prostitute, his hatred of women and stated desire to kill or injure a prostitute, his actions of hiding body, fleeing from scene and calling a friend for ride suggested that defendant was aware of his actions. State v. Harris, App. 1 Cir.1988, 527 So.2d 1140.

MA ST 265 1
MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS ANNOTATED
PART IV. CRIMES, PUNISHMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES TITLE I. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
CHAPTER 265. CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
214. Hearsay, admissibility of evidence--In general
In prosecution of defendant for fatal shooting of prostitute, hearsay testimony of brief exchange of words between defendant and transvestite, in which transvestite stated that defendant had a gun and defendant replied, "so what if I do," was admissible as an admission. Com. v. Earltop (1977) 361 N.E.2d 220, 372 Mass. 199.

MO ST 546.180
VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES
TITLE XXXVII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 546. TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND EXECUTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES TRIALS
Prosecutor showed sufficient reasons for striking five of the seven black panel members by showing that one had a close relative charged with a violent crime, one had a brother who had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, both of those two gave weak responses regarding whether they could fairly consider the sentence of death, a third stated that she had not thought much about the death penalty even though she listened to questions about the death penalty during morning session voir dire and had an opportunity to think about it over lunch, fourth member had a brother who worked in a correctional institution and gave weak answers concerning her ability to consider the death penalty, and fifth person had seen the victim's son, who was a prosecution witness and who was a homosexual transvestite, on television and on the streets. State v. Kilgore, 1989, 771 S.W.2d 57, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 211, 493 U.S. 874, 107 L.Ed.2d 164, post-conviction relief dismissed 791 S.W.2d 393.

MT ST 40-4-212
MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 40. FAMILY LAW
CHAPTER 4. TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE, CHILD CUSTODY, SUPPORT
PART 2. SUPPORT, CUSTODY, VISITATION, AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Visitation Restrictions Based on Unsupported Claims of Potential Harm From Transvestism as Abuse of Discretion: Wife claimed that husband had exhibited compulsive transvestite tendencies and that exposure of the child to that behavior could result in irreparable harm. The trial court agreed, severely limiting visitation to the daytime weekend hours and requiring that visits be supervised by the wife or an adult, nontransvestite member of the husband's family. However, every expert who testified on the issue stated that: (1) the husband's therapy had been successful; (2) the husband exhibited above-average parenting skills; (3) any negative impact on the child because of the father's behavior would be less than the impact from not having a normal relationship with the father; and (4) the highly restrictive visitation arrangement was not conducive to a normal father-child relationship. The trial court's imposition of visitation restrictions, in spite of uncontroverted expert testimony, was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. In re Marriage of D.F.D. & D.G.D., 261 M 186, 862 P2d 368, 50 St. Rep. 1280 (1993).

N.C.App. 1975.
Trial judge, in murder prosecution, did not abuse discretion by allowing district attorney to question prospective jurors regarding their prejudices or predispositions for or against homosexuals or transvestites where certain of state's witnesses had homosexual or transvestite tendencies. (Cite as: 27 N.C.App. 369, 219 S.E.2d 249)


NJ ST 2A:52-1
NEW JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED
TITLE 2A. ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SUBTITLE 6. SPECIFIC CIVIL ACTIONS
CHAPTER 52. NAMES; CHANGE OF
3. Permissible changes
Absent fraud or other improper purpose, fact that name change applicant had chosen "female" name did not warrant denial of application, whether transsexual applicant had undergone or intended to undergo sex change through surgery, whether he had received hormonal injections to induce physical change, whether he was transvestite, or whether he simply wanted to change from traditional "male" first name to traditionally "female" name. Matter of Eck, 245 N.J.Super. 220, 584 A.2d 859 (A.D.1991).

MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CHAPTER EIGHT OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS
ARTICLE 63--INJUNCTION
Tenant, as assignee of commercial lease for operation of bar/restaurant in hotel, was not entitled to preliminary injunction tolling time to cure its alleged default; although tenant had agreed to abide by terms of original lease with respect to strict limitations on the operation of restaurant and bar, it claimed it was not violating the lease by advertising live entertainment in the form of a transvestite musical revue, and evidenced lack of good faith in that the revue was advertised during a stay entered on the tenant's appeal of a judgment in the landlord's favor. Cemco Restaurants, Inc. v. Ten Park Ave. Tenants Corp. (1 Dept. 1987) 135 A.D.2d 461, 522 N.Y.S.2d 151, appeal dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 840, 530 N.Y.S.2d 555, 526 N.E.2d 47.

NY CIV RTS 61
MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
CHAPTER 6 OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS
ARTICLE 6--CHANGE OF NAME
5. Sufficiency of petition
Petitioner failed to set forth sufficient facts to warrant grant of application to change first name from William, an obvious male name, to Veronica, an obvious female name; he failed to submit medical and psychiatric evidence as to whether he was a transvestite or transsexual and, if a transsexual, whether he had undergone a sex change operation. Application of Anonymous, 1992, 155 Misc.2d 241, 587 N.Y.S.2d 548.

NY CRIM PRO 255.20
MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CHAPTER 11-A OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS
PART TWO--THE PRINCIPAL PROCEEDINGS
TITLE J--PROSECUTION OF INDICTMENTS IN SUPERIOR COURTS--PLEA TO SENTENCE ARTICLE 255--PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS
19. ---- Interest of justice
Possibility that police officer's belief that he was arresting a female could not have been discovered until officer actually testified at Wade hearing was sufficient to meet good cause and interests of justice test permitting consideration of late suppression motion, where defendant was a male transvestite but was described in radio run as a male and Dunaway motion was made immediately after officer's testimony. People v. Perry, 1985, 128 Misc.2d 430, 488 N.Y.S.2d 977.

NY DOM REL Ch. 14, Art. 2
MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
CHAPTER 14 OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS
ARTICLE 2--MARRIAGES
.....marriage has been traditionally defined as the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life as husband and wife. A basic assumption, therefore, is that one of the two parties to the union must be male and the other must be female. However, the New York statutes do not explicitly prohibit marriages between persons of the same gender. On the other hand, the statutes do not authorize the issuance of marriage licenses to persons of the same gender. The statutes, further, do not make any attempt to define who is male and who is female. Despite these statutory omissions, the New York courts have consistently viewed it essential to the formation of a marriage that the parties be of different genders. Thus, where a male participated in a marriage ceremony with a male transvestite, believing the latter to be female, the court found that no valid marriage had been formed. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc.2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup.Ct. Queens County 1971). The Anonymous court defined marriage as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman and held that a marriage between two biological males is a legal nullity. Likewise, where a female participated in a marriage ceremony with a transsexual person who had been born with female organs and had undergone a mastectomy and hysterectomy and who was receiving androgenous hormonal therapy, the court found that no valid marriage had been formed. B. v. B., 78 Misc.2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup.Ct. Kings County 1974). The court concluded that the absence of male sexual organs, resulting in an inability to procreate, precluded a finding that the female had been effectively transformed into a male. The New York Court of Appeals has held that the state, as a matter of constitutional law, may not prosecute as criminal acts of consensual sodomy which take place between consenting adults in a private, noncommercial setting. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2323, 451 U.S. 987, 68 L.Ed.2d 845 (1981). The United States Supreme Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 54 U.S. 4919, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), rehearing denied 107 S.Ct. 29, 92 L.Ed.2d 779, on remand 804 F.2d 622, reached the opposite conclusion in rejecting a challenge to a Georgia statute which provided for criminal penalties for consensual sodomy. A narrow majority of the Court held that the federal Constitution does not confer upon homosexuals any fundamental right to engage in acts of consensual sodomy and that a state may permissibly prosecute criminal actions to punish homosexuals who commit such acts in violation of state law. The Supreme Court, however, reserved the question as to whether states may constitutionally criminalize consensual sodomy committed by heterosexuals. Further, a concurring Justice, whose vote was decisive, suggested that the maximum penalty permitted by the Georgia statute, 20 years' imprisonment for a single, private, consensual act, might violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

OH ST 2901.22
BALDWIN'S OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE XXIX. CRIMES--PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 2901. GENERAL PROVISIONS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
An individual cruising around town with a gun looking for a target, and clearly intending to kill, as shown by incidents of exposing his gun to a friend and stating "I'm going to do this" and "I have to do this," is guilty of aggravated murder; the doctrine of transferred intent clearly applies to the transfer of his intent from some easy target in the general public to the specific person of the unsuspecting transvestite he eventually shot. State v Harding, No. 94-CA-64, 1995 WL 276098 (2d Dist Ct App, Greene, 5-12-95).

OK ST T. 25 1451
OKLAHOMA STATUTES ANNOTATED
TITLE 25. DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 21. DISCRIMINATION
ARTICLE 4A. DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
6. "Handicap" means a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity, when there is a record of such an impairment, or the individual is regarded as having such an impairment. The term does not include current illegal use of or addiction to any drug or illegal or federally controlled substance. For purposes of this act, [FN1] "an individual with a handicap" or "handicap" does not apply to an individual because of sexual orientation or the sexual preference of the individual or because that individual is a transvestite.

SD ST 23A-18-1
SOUTH DAKOTA CODIFIED LAWS
TITLE 23A. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 23A-18. (RULE 23) TRIAL BY JURY OR COURT
Facts that defendant had an uncontrollable habit of smiling or laughing at inappropriate times; that he suffered from mental disorders which render a "paraphilia-transvestite fetishism," (i.e. cross-dressing); that he allegedly approached the victim while unclothed below the waist; that the primary issues in the case are legal, not factual, and defendant did not demonstrate that he was unable through the process of voir dire to exclude potential jurors who might bear hostility or bias toward him because of his socially unacceptable behavior, were not sufficient to establish the passion, prejudice and public feeling sufficient to override a prosecutor's objection to a defendant's waiver of a jury trial. State v. Van Roekel (1991) 472 NW 2d 919.


TX PROPERTY 301.003
VERNON'S TEXAS STATUTES AND CODES ANNOTATED
PROPERTY CODE
TITLE 15. FAIR HOUSING PRACTICES
CHAPTER 301. TEXAS FAIR HOUSING ACT
SUBCHAPTER A. TITLE, PURPOSE, AND DEFINITIONS
(6) "Disability" means a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity, a record of the impairment, or being regarded as having the impairment. The term does not include current illegal use or addiction to any drug or illegal or federally controlled substance and does not apply to an individual because of an individual's sexual orientation or because that individual is a transvestite.

VA ST 36-96.1:1
CODE OF VIRGINIA
TITLE 36. HOUSING.
CHAPTER 5.1. VIRGINIA FAIR HOUSING LAW.
"Handicap" means, with respect to a person, (i) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (ii) a record of having such an impairment; or (iii) being regarded as having such an impairment. The term does not include current, illegal use of, or addiction to a controlled substance as defined in Virginia or federal law. Neither the term "individual with handicap" nor the term "handicap" shall apply to an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite.


Selected cases

CITY OF COLUMBUS
v.
ZANDERS.
No. 31436.
Franklin County, Municipal Court of Ohio.
Oct. 13, 1970.
Prosecution under municipal ordinance prohibiting wearing dress of opposite sex. The Franklin County Municipal Court, Jenkins, J., held that where, because he was a true transsexual, defendant's course of conduct in dressing and posing as a female was more the result of an irresistible impulse or a loss of will power than a deliberate act or violation of municipal ordinance prohibiting a person from appearing in public in a dress not belonging to his or her sex, defendant could not be held criminally liable, and charges against him for violating ordinance would be dismissed. Dismissed. (Cite as: 25 Ohio Misc. 144, 266 N.E.2d 602)


The PEOPLE of the State of New York
v.
Gene SIMMONS, Defendant.
Criminal Court of the City New York, Kings County, Part AP 5.
June 11, 1974.
Defendant was charged with larceny, prostitution and criminal impersonation. The Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County, M. Marvin Berger, J., held that evidence was sufficient to require holding defendant for trial on charges of larceny and prostitution and that statute pertaining to criminal impersonation does not proscribe cross-dressing. Ordered accordingly. (Cite as: 79 Misc.2d 249, 357 N.Y.S.2d 362)


These statutes were listed for informational purposes only, and are not to be construed as legal advice.

Note: In case you were wondering, Romero Anton Montalban-Anderssen, Juris Doctor, is not a transvestite, nor has he ever been one. However, he is a fan of the Rocky Horror Picture Show.


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